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Recent Developments 
California v. Greenwood: 
WARRANT NOT NEEDED FOR 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF 
GARBAGE LEFT FOR COLLECTION 
ON PUBLIC STREET. 
In California v. Greenwood, _U.S~, 
108 S. Ct. 1625, (1988), the United States 
Supreme Court held that warrantless sear-
ches and seizures of garbage left for collec-
tion on a public street do not infringe 
upon a reasonable expectation of privacy 
under the fourth amendment. The Court 
explained that a state law right to be free 
from warrantless searches of trash, bal-
anced against the cost of excluding reliable 
evidence of criminal activity, does not 
create a reasonable "privacy" expectation 
that must be recognized under either the 
fourth amendment or the Due Process 
Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
Billy Greenwood and Dyanne Van 
Houten were arrested on felony narcotics 
charges in early 1984 after police dis-
covered quantities of cocaine and hashish 
in the Greenwood home. Prior to the 
search of the house, police received infor-
mation indicating that Greenwood might 
be engaged in narcotics trafficking. Acting 
on the information received from a federal 
drug enforcement agent, police conducted 
a surveillance of the house. On two sepa-
rate occasions, the police asked the regular 
trash collector to pick up plastic garbage 
bags left on the curb in front of Green-
wood's house and to turn over the bags to 
the police without mixing their contents. 
During a search through the rubbish, the 
Laguna Beach Police Department found 
items indicative of narcotics use. An affida-
vit in support of a search warrant was 
issued based upon the items seized. In the 
respondent's presence, police discovered 
controlled substances which subsequently 
led to the arrest of Greenwood and Van 
Houten. 
Following his release, the police contin-
ued its surveillance of Greenwood during 
which they observed many late night visi-
tors to his residence. In the same manner 
as before, the police searched garbage left 
for collection by Greenwood and found 
more evidence of narcotics use. Conse-
quently, a second search warrant was exe-
cuted and while searching the house, 
police found more narcotics and evidence 
of narcotics trafficking and arrested Green-
wood. 
Finding that probable cause to search the 
house would not have existed without the 
evidence obtained from the trash searches, 
the state superior court dismissed the 
charges against the respondents under the 
authority of People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 
357,486 P.2d 1262 (1971). That court held 
that a warrantless search of trash bags vio-
lated the fourth amendment and the Cali-
fornia Constitution. California v. 
Greenwood, 108 S. Ct., at 1628 (1988). The 
California Court of Appeals affirmed. The 
appellate court noted that the "fruits of 
warrantless trash searches could no longer 
be suppressed" under the state's constitu-
tional amendment eliminating the exclu-
sionary rule regarding evidence seized in 
violation of the California law but not fed-
eral law. Id. The court of appeals also 
noted that under Krivda, "warrantless 
trash searches were also to be excluded 
.under federal law." Krivda, 182 Cal. App. 
3d at 735, 227 Cal. Rptr., at 542, (quoted 
in Greenwood, at 1628). At the same time, 
the court granted Van Houten standing to 
seek the suppression of evidence seized 
during the first search of Greenwood's 
home. Greenwood, 108 S.Ct. at 1629, n.1. 
The state petitioned the California 
Supreme Court to review the court of 
appeals' decision; however, this petition 
was denied. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and reversed. 
Writing for the majority, Justice White 
focused on the issue of whether the fourth 
amendment prohibited the warrantless 
search and seizure of garbage left for the 
collection outside the curtilage of the 
home. In holding that the warrantless 
search and seizure of garbage bags left at 
the curb would violate the fourth amend-
ment only if respondents manifested a sub-
jective expectation of privacy in their 
garbage, Justice White declared that socie-
ty does not recognize trash voluntarily dis-
carded in areas suited for public inspection 
as a reasonable expectation of privacy. The 
Court reasoned that based on "common 
knowledge that plastic garbage bags ... are 
readily accessible to animals, children, 
scavengers, snoops, and other members of 
the public," it would not be reasonable to 
expect trash to be free from intrusion. Id. 
at 1628-29. In so holding, the Court reject-
ed the respondents' main contention that 
an expectation of privacy exists in garbage 
left on the street for collection at a fixed 
time, when contained in opaque plastic 
bags, expected to be picked up with the 
trash of others and deposited at the gar-
bage dump. Id. at 1628. 
In determining that the warrantless 
search of garbage did not give rise to a 
"societal expectation of privacy," the 
Court declared that "an expectation of 
privacy does not give rise to fourth amend-
ment protection ... unless society is pre-
pared to accept that expectation as 
objectively reasonable." Id. The Court fur-
ther determined that the respondents vol-
untarily left their trash for collection in an 
area for an express purpose of conveying it 
to a third party, the trash collector, who 
might himself have sorted through it or 
permitted others, such as the police, to do 
so. Thus, a claim in the inculpatory items 
discarded could not be subject to fourth 
amendment protection. Id. at 1629. 
Recognizing that what a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his 
own home or office, is not subject to 
fourth amendment protection, the Court 
added that "police cannot reasonably be 
expected to avert their eyes from evidence 
of criminal activity that could have been 
observed by any member of the public." 
ld. Persuasive to the Court on this proposi-
tion were the holdings in the cases of 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) and 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
In Smith, the Supreme Court held that an 
individual "has no legitimate expectation 
of privacy in information he voluntarily 
turns over to third parties." Id. In Ciraolo, 
the Court held that protection of the 
home' under the fourth amendment had 
never required police to obtain a search 
warrant before conducting a surveillance 
of the home, based on observations made 
from a public vantage point where any 
member of the public could make the same 
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observations. Id. Thus, the Court conclud-
ed that in Greenwood's case, an expecta-
tion of privacy in trash left on a public 
street did not deserve protection from 
police warrantless searches and seizures as 
an expectation society was prepared to 
honor.ld. 
Rather, than conclude that Greenwood's 
expectation had been frustrated, the Court 
relied on the unanimous rejection of simi-
lar claims by the Federal Courts of Appeal. 
In each of these cases, the courts found 
that a reasonable expectation of privacy 
did not exist with respect to trash discard-
ed outside the home and the curtilage 
thereof, thus being accessible to war-
rantless searches and seizures. Id. [Cita-
tions omitted.] 
On the issue of whether an expectation 
of privacy in garbage should be deemed 
reasonable as a matter of federal law when 
the warrantless search and seizure of gar-
bage is impermissible as a matter of state 
law, the majority stated that state law may 
impose more stringent constraints in 
police conduct involving searches than fed-
eral law. Id. at 1630. However, the Court 
declared that "there is no such understand-
ing with respect to garbage left for collec-
tion at the side of a public street." Id. at 
1630-31. 
Finally, the Court noted that evidence 
obtained in violation of state law need not 
be suppressed within the scope of the 
fourth amendment exclusionary rule when 
the benefits of deterring police misconduct 
do not outweigh the costs of excluding 
reliable evidence of criminal activity. Id. at 
1631. Since the state may eliminate the 
exclusionary rule as a remendy for viola-
tions of that right, the majority held that 
it may also adopt a similar balancing 
approach in concluding that "the benefits 
of excluding relevant evidence of criminal 
activity do not outweigh the costs when 
police conduct at issue does not violate fed-
erallaw." Id Therefore, the Court found 
no merit in Greenwood's argument that 
because California eliminated the exclu-
sionary rule for evidence seized in viola-
tion of state, but not federal law, the state 
violated the Due Process Clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. Id. 
Justice Brennan, with Justice Marshall, 
dissented. Brennan opined that individuals 
have the reasonable expectation that the 
aspects of their private lives are concealed 
safely in a trash bag free from examination 
and inspection wherever they may be as 
long as the contents are not in "plain 
view," thus enjoying protection under the 
fourth amendment. Id at 1633. In conclu-
ding that an expectation of privacy attach-
es to any container unless "it so clearly 
announces its contents," the dissent 
argued that trash bags are to be afforded 
fourth amendment protection. Citing Rob-
bins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), 
Brennan contended: 
[E]ven if one wished to import such a 
distinction into the fourth amend-
ment, it is difficult if not impossible to 
perceive any objective criteria by 
which that task might be accomplish-
ed. What one person may put into a 
suitcase, another may put into a paper 
bag ... And ... no court, no constable, 
no citizen, can sensibly be asked to dis-
tinguish the relative "privacy 
interests" in a closed suitcase, brief-
case, portfolio, duffle bag, or box. 
Id. at 426-27, quoted in California v. 
Greenwood, at 1632. 
The dissent found the majority's analysis 
to be unpersuasive on the theory that trash 
is abandoned and therefore not entitled to 
an expectation of privacy. Brennan 
explained that an expectation of privacy 
cannot be negated when a person seeks to 
preserve as private the disposal of refuge. 
Greenwood, 108 S.Ct. at 1637. He reasoned 
that the voluntary relinquishment of 
possession or control over an item does 
not lose fourth amendment protection, 
even if placed in a mailbox, and therefore 
the possibility of such an intrusion by 
third parties should not justify a war-
rantless search by police. Thus, as viewed 
by Brennan and Marshall, it was unreason-
able for the majority to have concluded 
that Greenwood had no expectation of 
privacy in his trash. To hold that the war-
rantless search of disposed trash was con-
sistent with the fourth amendment, the 
court "paints a grim picture of our socie-
ty." Id. at 1636-37. 
In Greenwood, the Court failed to 
address whether the curtilage question 
should be resolved with particular refer-
ence to the proximity of the area claimed 
to be "curtilage" to the home. Addition-
ally, the Court did not give effect to the 
fact that trash bags used by Greenwood 
were opaque and not in "plain view," a 
factor generally recognized as constituting 
items free from police warrantless searches 
and seizures under the fourth amendment. 
While the Court rejected the notion that 
an expectation of privacy may not extend 
to garbage placed on a public street, and 
that its contents may be seized without a 
warrant, it necessarily follows that persons 
engaged in noncriminal activity will no 
longer be able to dwell in reasonable secu-
rity and freedom from surveillance, as such 
is an expectation no longer protected by 
the courts as one society now honors. 
-Gloria S. Wilson 
B.N. v. K.K.: FRAUD, INTENTIONAL 
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DIS-
TRESS, AND NEGLIGENCE 
APPLICABLE WHEN RESULTING 
FROM SEXUAL TRANSMISSIONS 
OF DANGEROUS, CONTAGIOUS 
AND INCURABLE DISEASE 
In B.N. v. K.K, 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 
1175 (1988), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, in a case certified by the United 
States District Court for the District of 
Maryland, held that Maryland does recog-
nize causes of action for fraud, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and negli-
gence, resulting from the sexual transmis-
sion of a dangerous, contagious, and 
incurable disease, such as genital herpes. 
Each named cause of action, however, is 
subject to the proper factual showing by 
the plaintiff and any defense raised by the 
defendant. 
Ms. N. was employed as a nurse at Johns 
Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland, 
between July and December, 1983. Dr. K. 
also worked at Hopkins Hospital for part 
of that period. From July through 
Ocotber, 1983, Ms. N. and Dr. K. "were 
involved in an lntlIDate boyfriend-
girlfriend relationship" and "engaged in 
acts of sexual intercourse." Id. at 138, 538 
A.2d at 1177. While this was going on, Dr. 
K. knew he had genital herpes, but did not 
disclose this to Ms. N., who neither knew 
nor had any reason to believe that Dr. K. 
was a carrier of genital herpes. Id On or 
about October 1, 1983, Ms. N. and Dr. K. 
engaged in sexual intercourse. On that date 
Dr. K. knew that his disease was active and 
would probably be transmitted to Ms. N. 
through sexual intercourse. That result in 
fact occurred and was caused by Dr. K.'s 
conduct, inasmuch as Ms. N. never 
engaged in sexual contact with anyone but 
Dr. K. during the relevant period. Id at 
138-9, 538 A.2d at 1177. 
Ms. N. brought suit against Dr. K. in the 
United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland, alleging fraud, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, 
negligence and assault and battery. The 
case was then certified to the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland by the U.S. District 
Court pursuant to the Maryland Uniform 
Certification of Questions of Law Act, 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann., §§12-
601 through 12-609 (1984 Repl. Vol.). 
The question certified asked: 
Does Maryland Recognize A Cause Of 
Action For Either Fraud, Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress, Or 
Negligence Resulting From the Sexual 
Transmission Of A Dangerous, Conta-
gious, and Incurable Disease, Such As 
Genital Herpes? 
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